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OIL AND GAS
MINES AND MINERALS - EXTENT OF IMPLIED
OBLIGATION OF DEVELOPMENT IN OIL AND GAS LEASE
Lessor executed in 1916 a term "unless" oil and gas lease
covering a half section and an adjoining one-sixteenth section, or
360 acres in all. During the ten-year primary term, the lessee
drilled two small paying wells on the adjoining one-sixteenth section. These were later claimed to keep the entire lease alive as
long as there was production in paying quantities. No further
drilling occurred anywhere on the property.
Then lessee and
subsequent assignees asserted that neighborhood dry holes indicated further drilling in either the Bartlesville sand or the
Mississippi lime throughout the rest of the estate would prove
unprofitable. With the half section wholly untouched and no
indication of immediate activity on the part of the lessee, lessor
in 1929 sued for cancellation of the lease as to the undeveloped
portion thereof.
Upon removal on diversity grounds by the
lessee's assignee, the trial Federal court decreed cancellation except as to a small tract surrounding the two producers. An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Held: (one judge
dissenting) There was no breach of the implied obligation to
develop where the geological information at hand tended to indicate that the half section could not be operated profitably.
Judgment reversed. (Petition for writ of certiorari pending).
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Sauder, et al.'
The implied obligation to develop is a reasonable relational
incident imposed by law.2 It is made a covenant or condition by
necessary implication where royalty is the chief consideration
which induced the contract3 and such implication is as effectually
one of the terms of the lease as if it had been expressed.' Drilling
and/or developing is especially to be inferred to be the chief
consideration for the lease when the initial down-payment is small.'
The implied obligation to reasonably develop exists without regard
167 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
2Peoples Gas Co. v. Dean, 193 Fed. 938, 113 C. C. A. 566 (1911); Allen v.
Colonial Oil Co., 92 W. Va. 689, 115 S. E. 842 (1923).
'Mills v. Hartz, 77 Kan. 218, 94 Pac. 142 (1908); Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc
Co., 140 Fed. 801 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905).
' Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., supra n. 3.
'Day v. Kansas City Pipe Line Co., 87 Kan. 617, 125 Pac. 43 (1912).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1934

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [1934], Art. 7

OIL AND GAS
to whether the lessee's interest may be a fee simple determinable,"
a profit d prendre, or an incorporeal right.8 The leading case
dealing with partial cancellation of oil and gas leases
for the failure to reasonably
develop
is Brewster V.
Lanyon Zinc Co.,' which holds that neither of the parties is the
arbiter of reasonableness in developmentf' but that the development must be that of a reasonable and prudent man. The other
view is that the good faith of the lessee is the test, based on prevailing economic circumstances.'
Because each case is of necessity determined on its own
factual situation, the rules of one case may not be applicable to
the facts of another: thus, the hopeless diversity of decisions on,
seemingly, similar facts. In a recent Circuit Court of Appeals
decision it was held that twelve wells scattered over a 10,000 acre
tract constituted reasonable development where the evidence
showed no threat of drainage, that further development of it would
result in loss, and the absence of proof that a reasonable man
would develop it; yet the lessee also asserted that the property
had production possibilities and that he would develop on change
of conditions. On the other hand, in an earlier Circuit Court of
Appeals decision it was held that two producing gas wells on a tract
of 900 acres were not reasonable development, even though the
'In Texas after oil or gas has been produced in paying quantities under an
habendum clause the lessee's right in the land is a fee simple determinable,
termination on failure to extract oil or gas.
Mon-Tex Corp. v. Poteet, 118 Tex. 546, 19 S. W. (2d) 32, 33 (1929); Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F. (2d) 634 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932).
' In ]Kansas when the lessee has fulfilled the requirement of the IIhabendum
clause his interest is a 'profit a prendre'. Brinkman v. Empire Gas & Fuel
Co., 120 Kan. 602, 245 Pac. 107 (1926).
' In West Virginia it is held that the lessee has after oil or gas has been
produced an incorporeal interest in the land. State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42
W. Va. 80, 24 S. E. 688 (1896).
Supra n. 3.
'0The West Virginia court has adopted the test in the case, Brewster v.
Lanyon Zinc Co., supra n. 3. In Hays v. Bowser, 110 W. Va. 323, 325,
158 S. E. 169, 170, the court says "we are committed to the view that
the implied duty of the defendant to sink additional wells in this case depended on whether (a) the plaintiff's land needed protection from drainage
of oil and gas through adjoining tracts, or (b) operators of oil and gas of
ordinary prudence and experience in the same neighborhood and under sineilar conditions had been proceeding successfully with the further development
of their lands or leases; and whether such additional wells would likely have
been to the mutual profit of both lessors and lessee."
"Note (1929) 7 Tx. L. Ruv. 438, 443, Ili. e. prevailing market conditions, storage costs saved by leaving the mineral in situ, policy of discovery
rather than producing, holding up for further development to effect advantageous purchases in the region."
'Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, supra n. 6.
'White et. al. v. Green River Gas Co., 8 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 6, 1925).
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lessee's assignee alleged that the pressure was too low to transport it to a distant market. A more difficult problem arises where
adjoining tracts of heterogeneous nature are held under a single
lease, and where it is contended that drilling of wells on one tract
of the lease is development of all the leased tracts."
The principal case, seemingly, has gone far in permitting the
lessee to be the arbiter in determining what is reasonable diligence. So long as mineral is not drained away and lessee has a
producing well, he may hold all of the tract for speculative purposes and prevent development, by merely asserting that geological inferences lead to the conclusion that there is not sufficient
underlying mineral to warrant drilling. This assertion the court
approves, despite knowledge that geological inferences are fallible,
and though the effort of the lessee's assignee in court to prevent
cancellation is inconsistent with the stand that minerals do not
exist in such quantities as to warrant further developing.
-- JoHN L. DETCH.

MINES AND AIINERIALS - PARTIAL CANCELLATION OF
OIL AND GAS LEASE
Suit in equity was brought against the lessee holding under
a renewal term "or" oil and gas lease, either to obtain cancellation by reason of alleged fraudulent drainage or to compel further
development of the property, in addition to the well already
drilled by lessee. The trial chancellor, on testimony offered by
the heirs of the lessor, decreed the drilling of an additional well,
with the possibility of a second, or payment of royalty therefore,
and, in default thereof, that there be cancellation, (R., p. 324),
as to all except 37 1/3 acres around tite present producing well.
Lessee appealed. Held: Where allegations and proof establish
with reasonable certainty fraudulent drainage, lessee may be compelled to sink an offset well (and here but one), or "submit to a
forfeiture of all, except an acreage around the well theretofore
drilled under the lease." Accordingly, lower court decree modified and affirmed. Adkins v. Huntington Development & Gas
(o.'
The instant decision as to partial cancellation must be dis" Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover, 78 Okla. 158, 189 Pac. 540 (1920) ; cf. Pierce Oil
Corp. v. Schacht, 75 Okla. 101, 181 Pac. 731 (1919).
'168 S. E. 366 (W. Va. 1933).
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